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The Peace programme for Northern Ireland
One of the more distinctive features of EU regional 
policy during the 1990s was the special support 
programme for peace and reconciliation in Northern 
Ireland. This was not only an expression of satisfaction 
at European level at the ending of violence within the 
province, but also highlighted the extent to which EU 
financial support, and the fact that both Ireland and 
the United Kingdom were members of the Union, could 
play an important role in cementing a lasting peace.
The origins of the initiative go back to 1994 and the 
announcement on 31 August by the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) that it intended to make permanent the 
‘temporary’ ceasefire that it had announced that April. 
Commission President Jacques Delors was one of 
many to react positively, affirming the EU’s ‘support for 
the ongoing peace process’ and stating a willingness 
to consider additional financial measures to help 
Northern Ireland (1). These would be in addition to the 
ECU 25 million the Community had already been 
contributing to the International Fund for Ireland set up 
in response to the 1986 Anglo-Irish Agreement (2).
Both the Irish government and that of the United 
Kingdom were quick to respond to Delors’s 
announcement. John Major, the UK Prime Minister, 
replied within 2 days, and by early September the 
Commission had been encouraged to push ahead at 
an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers (3). In 
response Delors asked the Deputy Secretary-General, 
Carlo Trojan, who already had some knowledge of 
Northern Ireland from his involvement with the 
International Fund for Ireland, to form a task force on 
the question comprising a number of Northern Irish 
officials from across the Commission, along with 
representatives of those parts of the Commission 
likely to be involved in delivering a regional aid 
package and members of the cabinets of Sir Leon 
Brittan, Bruce Millan and Pádraig Flynn (4). After a 
preliminary meeting on 3 October its first formal 
session took place on 14 October 1994 (5).
The European Parliament was also keen to get 
involved, and the three Northern Irish MEPs in 
(1) See Europe in Northern Ireland, No 89, European Commission 
Office, Belfast, September-December 1994.
(2) Interview with Carlo Trojan, 2 June 2017.
(3) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/1, ‘Letter from John Major to Jacques 
 Delors’, 2 September 1994.
(4) Interview with Carlo Trojan, 2 June 2017.
(5) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/4, ‘Summary records of the five meetings 
of the task-force “Northern Ireland”’.
particular (6). Ian Paisley, John Hume and Jim 
Nicholson met with Delors on 13 October and 
thereafter involved themselves closely with the work 
of the task force and the implementation of the 
Commission programme (7). Crucially though, neither 
the Commission nor the MEPs felt it appropriate for 
the scheme to be devised primarily in Brussels. 
Instead, as Trojan underlined, it was ‘the result of 
widespread consultation with the British and Irish 
governments, the Northern Irish authorities, MEPs, 
local authorities, the voluntary sectors, and many 
other committed people on the ground’ (8). To this end, 
three Northern Irish Commission officials were sent to 
the province in October to consult as widely as 
possible (they met over 300 people in 4 days), Trojan 
himself visited Belfast in November and a large 
number of written submissions were considered by the 
task force (9). Both the programme and its subsequent 
implementation were hence as much bottom-up 
processes as top-down. Indeed, a 1997 report drawn 
up on behalf of the three Northern Irish MEPs 
assessing the programme identified the dialogue it 
had fostered among and with local-level ‘partnerships’ 
as one of the most positive outcomes of the whole 
process (10).
By late November the task force had completed its 
report, and the Commission won budgetary approval 
from the Parliament and Council to cover the 
additional expenditure planned (11). On 7 December the 
Commission adopted a communication on the 
programme in time for it to be considered by the Essen 
(6) The Parliament passed a resolution on the peace process in 
Northern Ireland on 27 September 1994.
(7) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/1, ‘Boyd note for the file on Delors’s meet-
ing with the NIRL MEPs’, 14 October 1994.
(8) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/4, ‘Investment Conference dinner speech 
by Carlo Trojan, Belfast’, 13 December 1994.
(9) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/11, ‘Note to Carlo Trojan from special ad-
visers to Delors Task Force: H. Logue, H. McNally and R. Ramsey 
on the programme to support peace and reconciliation’, 31 Oc-
tober 1994.
(10) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/10, ‘Special support programme for peace 
and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the border counties 
of Ireland — Revisited: report to Jacques Santer, President of 
the European Commission’, 1 October 1997.
(11) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/1, SEC(94) 9013, Rev. 1, ‘Report of the Task 
Force on Northern Ireland’, 29 November 1994; BAC 74/2000/4, 
‘Letter from President Jacques Delors to Klaus Hänsch’, 16 No-
vember 1994; and BAC 74/2000/4, ‘Trilogue on the adaption of 
financial perspectives in view of the enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union (Brussels, 29 November 1994) — Statement of con-
clusions’, 29 November 1994.
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European Council, where it met a positive response (1). 
The package of measures was to amount to 
ECU 300 million (then equivalent to about 
GBP 240 million) of additional funding for the province 
and was to cover a period of 5 years.
The task of turning this agreement in principle into a 
working scheme fell to the Santer Commission. By 
February a draft proposal was ready to be transmitted 
to the European Parliament (2). In order to sustain the 
political momentum behind the programme — and to 
underline the commitment of the new Commission — 
the new Commissioner for Regional Policy, Monika 
Wulf-Mathies, travelled to Ulster in late February, and 
then again in April. On the second occasion she was 
(1) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/1, COM(94) 607 final, 7 December 1994, 
‘A special support programme for peace and reconciliation 
in Northern Ireland’; PV(94), Minutes No 1226, second part, 
meeting of 7 December 1994; Presidency conclusions of the 
Essen European Council, 9 and 10 December 1994: http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/media/21198/essen-european-council.pdf
(2) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/7, SEC(95) 279 final, 14 February 1995, 
‘Draft notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for 
an initiative in the framework of the special support programme 
for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the border 
counties of Ireland’.
accompanied by Jacques Santer and Neil Kinnock (3). 
Finally, on 28 July 1995 the Commission was able to 
approve the initiative and start organising its 
implementation.
In substantive terms the vast majority of the 
ECU 300 million provided by the package was to be 
spent in Northern Ireland itself, although up to 20 % 
could be directed towards the border counties in 
Ireland. Much of the money would actually be spent by 
a number of intermediary funding bodies, independent 
of both national governments, and by a series of newly 
developed local partnerships involving representatives 
from district councils, community and voluntary groups 
and the private sector. Monika Wulf-Mathies was 
instrumental in ensuring that the resources would be 
used as far as possible for individual projects 
conceived or implemented with the involvement of 
both communities in Northern Ireland. Targets included 
urban regeneration, social-inclusion projects and the 
development of tourism infrastructure. Also funded 
were innovative projects that were outside the 
(3) HAEC, BAC 74/2000/7, ‘Note to file on Commissioner Wulf-
Mathies’ visit to Northern Ireland 27-28 February 1995’, Brus-
sels, 3 March 1995; the same file contains extensive paperwork 
on Santer’s visit.
Meeting between Commission President Jacques Santer and a delegation of new parliamentarians from Northern Ireland. 
From left to right: Jim Nicholson MEP; Seamus Mallon, Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland; Jacques Santer; 
David Trimble, First Minister of Northern Ireland; and John Hume, Leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party.
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important for sectors such as coal, steel, textiles and 
shipbuilding, which had experienced substantial 
job losses.
Under the 1989 reform the Commission increased 
the emphasis placed on harmonising data collec­
tion, not only through national statistical agencies 
but also through Eurostat, its own statistical ser­
vice. This service was used in particular to collect 
Community data on regional GDP and unemploy­
ment rates, so that the Commission evaluation used 
for the allocation of future supranational funding 
became more independent with respect to data 
 delivered by Member States.
The Commission also tackled the low profile of 
Community actions. From 1989 Member States 
were required to show, in their public accounts, 
the ‘additional’ resources from the Community, 
to demonstrate that the funding that made invest­
ments possible came on top of existing national re­
sources rather than replacing them (1). 
Further Community initiatives were also intro­
duced. Some of the well­known projects launched 
during 1989­1990 were Rechar, for the conversion of 
coal­mining areas; Envireg, for sustainable  regional 
development on environmental issues; REGIS, for 
the most remote regions; REGEN, designed to de­
velop networks for the transmission of natural gas 
and the distribution of electricity; Stride, devoted 
to initiatives to boost regional capacity in the field 
of research and technological development; and 
 Interreg, which addressed cross­border develop­
ment. The last of these was the most enduring, and 
today it is one of the three pillars of EU regional 
policy.
(1) Hall, R., ‘The development of regional policy in the process of European 
integration: an overview’, in Bischof, G. (ed.), Regional economic develop-
ment compared: EU-Europe and the American south, ‘Interdisziplinäre 
Forschung’ collection, Innsbruck University Press, Innsbruck, 2014, 
pp. 13­33.
normal scope of EU regional policy 
programmes, for example to address the complex 
needs of ex-prisoners. And, vitally, all of the money 
was additional to the sums that London, Dublin 
and the EU were already spending in the province. 
As such it would represent a very tangible ‘peace 
dividend’ and a symbol of European solidarity. As 
the UK government would later acknowledge, ‘EU 
support, and especially the Peace programme, 
made a vital contribution to securing the Good 
Friday Agreement’ (1).
Piers Ludlow
(1) HAEC, BAC 312/1999/128, ‘UK aide-mémoire’, 19 March 
1999.
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